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ABSTRACT
The central hypothesis of this paper is that both the extent and
speed of adjustment of the real exchange rate is affected by the way
the central bank manages the nominal exchange rate. Specifically, a
large discrete adjustment of the nominal exchange rate is more likely
to result in fast adjustment of prices as opposed to a policy of
smooth and continuous crawling peg. In the context of a monopolistic
price adjustment framework, it is shown that a discrete and unexpected
devaluation of the exchange rate shortens implicit price contracts and
increases the rate of price adjustment in the nontraded goods sector,
because firms tend to strengthen their expectations about an overall
increase in costs and about an aggregate as opposed to a local shift in
the demand curve for the firm's output. A discrete change in the
exchangerate acts as an "information signal" that leads to fast overall
adjustment of nontraded goods prices. The hypothesis is tested and not
rejectedat the macro, sectoral and firm level using macro and micro
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The origin of this paper can be traced back to early February 1983,
following a visit to a small shoe—repair shop in a suburb of Athens. The
owner of the shop angrily protested the decision of the firm which supplied
him shoe—oolish to issue a new price list which effectively raised the prices
of almost all of its main nroducts by a range of 20—34%. His anger was
focused not so much on the extent of the price change but on the fact that
contrary to expectations, the new price list was issued shortly after the
last list in 0ctober He maintained that this was a clear violation of
client—supplier relationshins since in the past the imnlicit price contract
set between them maintained prices unchanged for a period of 6 to 9 months.
The justification provided by the firm to this ilbreachof contract was the
"unprecedented"devaluatf on of the drachma during the preceding month. To
this the shoe—maker replied that the rice-surveillance department of the
Ministry of Coninerce should intervene since the firm used only domestically
produced inputs and thus used the Dretext of the devaluation to raise profits.
In Okun's terms "....customersannear willing to accept fair an
Increase in price based on a permanent increase In costa (Okun, 1975 ).
Forthe Athenian shoe—maker the January devaluation did notentail a
permanent Increase in cost to the shoe—polish firm. This attitude however,
was not shared by the firm itself.
On January 9, 1983 the drachma was devalued against the dollar by
15.5% raising the price of the dollar from 71 to 84 drs/$. On a
monthly average basis, the devaluation of the drachma between December 1982
and January 1983 was 14.14% against the dollar and 14.77% in effective
1.I would like to thank J.Anastassakou and E. Anarinostonoulou of KEPE
and Paul McGuire of Yale for heinful assistance. Financial surmort
from the (erman Plarshall Fund is aratefully acknowledqed.-2-
terms. As can be seen in Diagrams 1 and 2, this was the largest discrete
change both n the Drchl$ rate (BIE) and the effective rate (EFE) since the
introduction of the crawling peg system in March 1975. It was at that time
that the drachma ceased to be pegged to the US dollar and that a currency
basket consisting of 12 currencies became the basis for the conduct of ex—
change-Orate policy. Thus over a ten-year period of managed float, the Janua-
ry 1983 devaluation of the drachma was one of the few incidents of discrete
and large adjustment of the exchange rate as opposed to daily smooth crawling.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the effects of exchange-
rate management on price behavior and thus on the real exchange-rate in a
small semi-industrialized country like Greece.
Traditionally the main policy objective behind a nominal devaluation
is to promote competitiveness in third markets and to improve the balance of
payments. Setting aside J—curve considerations, the balance—payments effects
following a nominal devaluation depend (a) on the extent by which the real
exchange rate is deoreciated, and (b) on the effects of the real exchange
rate adjustment on net exnort receints.
Regarding the first factor there is already an extensive literature
on the subject that focuses on the potential adjustment of the relative
price of home to traded goods following adevaluation.2
Theincrease in the price of traded gOods relative to non—traded
goods asaresult of a devaluation shifts demand towards the non-traded




























































































goods sector giving rise to a current account surplus that increases
reserves and the moneysuaply.The degree of balance-of-nayments improve-
ment depends on elasticities, income and absorption effects, conditions
in asset markets and finally expectations. Eventually the price of non-
traded goods will rise to its steady state level. In the mean-time employ-
meat and output in the non—traded good sector will increase (Katseli, 1980).
As has been shown elsewhere (Katseli, 1980) these results are sensi-
tive to the underlying assumptions regarding the structural characteristics
of the economy and more specifically to the degree of wage indexation and
the presence of imoorted intermediate goods. In both these cases the de-
mand shift is coupled with a cost shift making the effects on the real ex-
change rate, the output response and the balance—of-payments at best
ambiguous.
In the absence of real—exchange rate adjustment, a devaluation
can work solely through a real balance effect. The increase in the price
of foreign exchange then reduces real balances. If the demand for money
is exogenously determined3, the excess demand for money is translated into
a reduction in absortion and a balance of payments surplus which is the
vehicle by which money balances are replenished (Katseli, 1983). In this
case as absortion is reduced, the improvement in the balance-of-payments
is achieved at the expense of outut and employment creation in the non-
traded good sector.
Thus the aggregate output and employment response to a devaluation
critically depends on the responsiveness of the real-exchange rate
3.In the traditional Polak model (1957) this is guaranteed by perfect
substitutability of all goods and assets in a small open economy and
oerfect flexibility of wages and prices.to the nominal devaluation. Given these r.dnsiderations,
it is important to look at the imnlications of exchange rate management for
real exchange rate develonments.
Thecentral hypothesis of this oaøer is that both the extent and
speed of adjustment of the real-exchange rate is affected by the way the
CentralBank manages the nominal exchange rate. Specifically, a large
discrete adjustment of the nominal exchance rate is more likely to result
infast adjustment of prices as opposed to a policy of smooth and continuous
crawling peg. To use R. Cooners terminology, whether exchange rate policy
occupies the "high"or "low—politics realm" does in fact matter for a countrys
competitiveness and the output and emnloyment effects in the adjustment pe-
riod.
If domestic prices instantaneously adjust to their steadyState
level ,then the improvement in the balance of payment can come about only
througha natural or nolicy-induced squeeze in absorntion. In both cases,
the effects of the devaluation tend to be staqflationary at least in the
non—tradedgood sector,
The channel through which management of the nominal exchange rate
influences real-exchange rate develooments is the process of price adjust-
ment.As it willbe shown in Section 2 of the paper, thisprocess has at
least two important features, namely the magnitude and frequency of price
changes. The existing finance literature on exchange rate policy has fo
cused largely on the first aspect only, that is on the responsiveness of
domestic prices to a nominal devaluation. The industrial organisatiori and
macroeconomic literature on the other hand has increasingly focused on
sluggishness. As Barro has noticed,—7-.
Thefirm's elastic demand curve must be discarded in
disequilibrium if the firm is ever to change price. In
this sense the response of nrices to disequilibrium is
essentially a monopolistic phenomenon even if the indi-
vidual units perform as perfect competitors in equili-
brium. Therefore, it seems clear that a theory of mono-
nolistic price adjustment is a prerequisite to a general
theory of once adjustment. (Barro, 1972, p. 17).
Mononolistic price adjustment implies joint determination of two pricing
features on the part of the firm: (a) length of the implicit or explicit uprice
contract" and (b) magnitude of adjustment at the end of the contract period.
As Gray has shown (1976), analogous modelling can be applied to the workings
of a labor market which is characterized by the existence of a strong union.
In that case it is the contract length and the indexing parameter that be-
come the imnortant contract characteristics.
In merging these two trends in literature, this paper argues that
exchange rate management can affect both the length of the once-contract
between firms and clients as well as the magnitude of price adjustment.
This hypothesis can be tested directly only through the use of micro or
firm—level data since the path of price adjustment varies across firms.
Such data are in fact available for Greek firms. As will be shown in
Section3 of the paper, prices set by Greek firms for specific products
exhibit properties of a step function. The contract length and the magni-
tude ofthe price adjustment can be thus investigated in relation to ex-
change rate management.
The econometric analysis of price behaviour by firms is complicat-
ed however, by the existence of special institutional factors under which
trading occurs. This is the case in most developing countries where there
is apt to be some institutional mechanism for price surveillance or direct
pricecontrois-.In the Greek case price controls have existed since the rnid30s.
After World War II, they covered only a small number of products and were
intended to curb excessive profits earned from the sale of goods in short
suoply. Over time, controls have been extended to cover numerous products
via snecification of once ceilings or of maximum allowable mark-ups over
costs. The tyne of control that is used varies across goodsand business
onerations and can be arrnlied to the industry, the wholesaler or the re-
tailer, that is to any stage within the production and/or distribution system.
(Lalonde and Papandreou, 1984).
The complexity of the system thus seriously hinders n extensive analysisof
pricebehavior by firms unless one investigates thoroughly the underlying
institutional arrangements that affect each specific product and orenter-
prise. In the presence of differentiated nroduct controls, nrofit maximizina
behavior on the )art of firms imolies that pricing of non—controlled items
also departs from expected pricing under free—market conditions. It
hasbeen noticed for exarnole that firms tend to once overall production
In such a way as to ensure large enough profits in somelines of production
andthus cover losses generated in the production of price-controlled products.
It follows that an increase in exnected or actual costs affects not only
thr?nvrall rlce le"l but alsorpl.tiup orices betwcen coriodities.
In view of these complexities, the central hypotheses of this paner
can be formulated as follows: in Section 2 it is argued that discrete
adjustment of the exchange rate tends to shorten the implicit price contract-'1—
betweensellers and buyers and to augment the rate of price adjustment.
This is so because firms tend to strengthen their expectations about an
overall increase in costs and about an aggregate shift in the demand curve
for the firms'outnut. A discrete change in the exchange rate thus acts as
an "information signal in the market that leads to relatively fast overall
price adjustment of traded and non-traded goods alike. Given the presence
of controls, one would tend to observe faster adjustment of orices for non-
controlled items even though sooner or later the regulatory agency itself
is apt to allow once increases in the controlled part of the market. The
outout resnonse to these effects denends not only on the exnected increase
in demand for the firm's outnut relative to costs but also on the ability
of each firm to diversify nroduction across commodities that are exemot
prom once controts.
The econometric analysis provided in Section 3 should be interpreted
with caution. Given the existing institutional complexities, it has to be
conducted at the macro, sectoral and firm level. Even though the existing
evidence is not conclusive, the data do not seem to reject the central
hynotheses making this line of research both interesting and promising.
2.
cbg_B.tg
In the international finance li.teratureexchanae
rate management has been analysed in the context of the ',enefits
and costs of alternative exchange rate regimes. As early as 1970, R. Cooner
and other authors argued for greater exchange rate flexibility on three
separate rrounds: (a) to orovide smoother adjustment to changing fundamentalS,
(b) to avoid speculative runs on the national currency and (c) to reestablish
the effectiveness of monetary policy (Cooper, 1973).10 -
Asconcensus on the advisability of flexible exchange rates grew,
the focus of attention shifted to the manner in which the 'gliding parity"
should be managed. It was demonstrated for example that exchange
rate adjustment could be unstable if the rate of change of thenominal
exchange rate followed the rate of change of foreign exchange reserves as
opoosed to developments in the current account or the basicbalance (Kenen,
Rodriguez, 1981). The so called 'shocktreatrnent", namely an unexpect
sudden devaluation or revaluation of the nominal exchange rate, was judged
inferior to the "gradualist solution" since itwasconsidered highly unlikely
thatcentral authorities would riossess the necessary information to arrive
at an equilibrium real exchange rate through discrete action (Rodriguez, 198i)
Desoitethe advantages of continuous exchange rate adjustment to
correct underlying fundamental disequilibria, a number of countries during
the recent years chose to pursue a discrete -adjustmentpolicy. Sweden,
Snain and Greece are the most recent examples.
Discrete adjustment 0f the nominal exchange rate has been usually
associated either with noliticaltransitions or interruptions in the normal
conduct ofexchange—rate policy. It is thus undertaIen at the beginnino of a
new qovernment1s term in office with a view towards slowing down the necessary
rate 0f devaluation in the following year and attributing the need for such
adjustment to past government policy. This was probably the pertinent scenario
in both Sweden and Snaln. Discrete adjustment is also initiated during
economic or
periods when for various/Institutional reasons, the real exchange rate becomes
overvalued giving.rlse to speculative runs on the currency. In both cases
the discrete adjustment of the nominal exchange rate is a response
to growing disequilibria In the economy.Lastly, discrete adjustment is— ii—
usedby r,olicy makers to influence exnectations about the future rate
of devaluation and thus the rate of inflation. It is often a signal for
a reversal in policy stance and is usually accompanied by other measures
in the fiscal or monetary domain. This is the most likelyexplanation
in the Greek case. Such adjustment, if credible, could in fact have nega-
tive real effects on output and employment.
As Calvo (1981) has shown, an unanticipated devaluation always
improves the balance of payments of a small and open economy, while below
acertain critical deficit level, an increase in the rate of devaluation
could bring about a deterioration.In the presence of non-traded goods,
theseresults will continue to hold especially iftherelative price of
tradedto non—traded goods is altered. A devaluation of the real exchange
rate4 thus trenathensthe case for balance-of-payments improvement (Katseli,
19R3). If as aresponse to an unanticipated devaluation, prices of non—
tradedgoods 'jump' to their steady—state value, then, even the transitory
improvementinthe balance—of-payments could be questioned. This is espe-
cially true in develonino countries where the decrease in absorption might
be limited by inflationary expectations that lead to an increase in con-
sumotion and imports of durables or an accumulation of inventories.
Furthermore, inflationary expectations and a decrease in output might reduce
money demand offsetting the excess demand for money that is necessaryfor
balance—of-payments improvement. It could thus be argued that a devaluation
of the real exchange rate becomes increasingly necessary for balance-
of-payments improvement when conditions for the smooth workingof the real-
balance effect are weak.
4. Defined as the ratio of traded to non-traded oood's prices.Can the process of once adjustment differ deDerding on the way the
exchange rate is managed? The answer would be rositive if one analyses price—
behavior in price—setting markets as opposed to simDle auction markets. As
Gordon (1981) has noted the assumption of "pervasive heterooeneity" in types
and quality of products and in the location and timing of transactions is
crucial for such theory of price adjustment. This anoroach thus
"undermines the new classical macroeconomic models sed on a
one—good economy postulated by identical price—taking yeoman farmers",
(Gordon, 1981) or Calvo'5 world of a one-family, one-good economy, where
"the once level is the exchange rate (i.e. therelativeprice) of domestic
currency in terms of some other given currency (Calvo,1981).
There is already a fairly substantive literature on the rnicro-eco—
nomic foundations of price-adjustment. Apart from issues that are related
to the existence of a "non-Walrasian"or 'conjectural" equilibrium,as earlyas
the 1960s another set of contributions attributed partial price adjustment
to adjustment costs and incomplete information. In that tradition onecould
cite the works by Aichian (1969),PhelPS and Winter (1970), Okun (1975) and
more recently Blinder (1980) andothers5.
From that view point and in sharp contrast to the prototype firm
oftraditional short-run market analysis nervasive heterogeneity and the
cost of information makes each firm behave in the short and medium run as a
monopolist. In that role it acts as a quantity taker and price maker.
AsOkun has noticed, "even firmswithminuscule market shares put price
tags ontheir corruiodities inthe short run, they are never surprised
by the once, and always subject to surprise about the quantities they
sell" (Okun, 1975, p.360).
Following this line of thought, Gordon (1981) has argued that the
fundamental reason for gradual price adjustment is the "large local compo-
nent of actual changes in demand and costs, tonether with the indenendence
of those costs and demand changes" (Gordon, 1981, n. 522). Combining price-
s.Foran excellent review see Gordon, (1981).- 13—
settingbehavior by a typical monopolist with Lucas'analysis of exnectation
formation he has reached the following conclusions: (a) that price adjustment
will be complete if perceived marginal cost responds fully to an aggregate
shock but not otherwise ;(b)that expected cost "mimics"expected aggregate
demand iftheaggregate variance of a shock dominates the local variance and
(c) that only in the extreme case when the aggregate component of the variance
of both demand and cost shifts is very large relative to the local component,
as during wartime or a hyDerinfiation, price adjustment captures fully the
aggregate demand shift.
In this view therefore heterooeneitv of nroducts make firms behave
as mononolists that nurchase their innuts and sell their outnut from/to
other firms. The extent to which a narticular shock that affects cost
and demand is nerceived as "local" or cilobal" critically affects nricina
decisions. The adjustment of once will be larcer if a shock in demand is
exoected to affect other firms as wellandthus at the end ,ive rise to an
increase in the firm's innut costs.
How can this framework be applied to exchange rate management? In the
case of a discretedevaluation which is typically large, there is "an
announcement effect". A high—level official usually announces to all market
participants that effective immediately, prices of all traded goods will be
increased. Such announcement thus firms expectations even in the non-traded
good sector that demand for output and the cost for inputs will increase.
The increase in production cost is expected to take the form not only of an
increase in the cost of imDorted inputs but also in the cost of intermediate
or capital goods purchased from other domestic firms. In the absence of labour
contracts, labor costs are expected to rise concommitanly while in the
unionized sector, wages are expected to be adjusted at the end14 -
ofthe contract period and/or contracts to be renegotiated. Discrete
adjustment of the exchange rate thus induces an expected increase in the over-
all cost of production,that is in both its local and aggregate components.
On the demand side, the larger the discrete devaluation, the greater the like-
lihood of an overall demand shift in the economy and thus the smaller the
perceived cost to the sDecific firm from raising its own price.
A discrete adjustment of the exchanae rate thus strengthens expecta-
tions reearcinn inflttory nressures in the economy that ,ill nroduce both an
increase in demand and raraina1 costs.
The trade—off between price and output adjustment depends on firm
specifics; However, the expected increase in marginal costs is more likely
to mirror the exnected increase in demand in the case of a discrete change
in the exchanQe rate as opposed to a crawling reg. Hence, in comparing these
two regimes one would expect price rather than output adjustment to be dorni-
nant in the former case.
Discrete adjustment of the exchange rate induces not only an increase
in the average exnected cost of production but also in the variance of the
aggregate component as opnosed to the local component. As the local compo-
nent of actual changes in demand and costs becomes small, price adjustment
inthe specific firmtends to anroximate the rate of devaluation.
Usinci a simple cost-nush model thatis similar to that developed by
Gordon(1981), it is easy to show that the percentage change in price
(Pft) will be positively related to adiscrete change of the exchange rate
defined as the ratio of the unexpected change in the exchange rate relative
R4-E(R)
to Its variance (——var- 15*
Forthe mononolist,P isweiqhted veraie of the actual chnne in nominal
revenue (ci) and of expected changes in marginal costs (E(Ct)). Thus,
(1) pit =+ (1_)E(Ct) where
I refers to the specific firm and E is the expectations ooerator.
Expected changes in marginal costs for the individual firmIis a
weighted averaae of the actual cost increase of imported inputs and expected
costs of other inputs that are affected by a different set of agents including
labour and/or other firms(W),Assuming that the chanae in the price of





(isthe ratio of the variance of the local comnonent of the cost shift to
the sum of the variance of the local and aggregate component.
Apart from a known component (W) that captures information about
existing contracts, oast pricing behaviour and known institutionel factors,
expectations about non firm-specific costs E(Wt) are assumed to be positively
affected by the unexpected significant increase in the exchange rate. Thus,




where 8isan indexation parameter.
Making all appropriate substitutions, it follows that,
R —
E(Rt). pit =t1to + (14)Z Rit +(1)(1z)(1)Wt8 (__..__- 16
Given equation (4) it is easy to see that P.is positively related
R-E(R)
it
to .Morespecifically if we assume that E(R )0 ar t
(Pit' R (14) ZVar Rt+(14)(1_Z)(1.P) 0
From (5) it follows that for any given unexpected change in the exchange
rate, P1 becomes larger as the aggregate component of the variance of costs
becomes larger in relation to the local component or W —0.This is pro-
bably the case when there is a switch in regimes from a smooth crawling peg,
to that of discrete exchange rate adjustment:If this is so, then not only
Rt E(R4)
E(Wt) but also (1-p) are positively related to —
VarR
Finally it should be noted that the increase in price will be even
larger if E(Wt)ismade to represent the exnected aggregate change in income.
In that case, as in Gordon,equation (3)couldbe replaced by,
R -E(R)
(3') E(W) =etwt + )+ (1-8)a.
VarRt
1
where the demand shift is assumed to consist of a local component and an
aggregate component. In (3,8likeis the ratio of the local component of
the demand shift to the sum of the local and aggregate variance.The
renlacement of (3) by(3oes not chanqe the nualitative nature of the
results.— 17-
Theanalysis so far limits itself to the magnitude of the price
resnonse to a discrete devaluation. One would exoect however, that
irv,ljcjt nrice contracts willalsobe rbitrarjly shortened or
renegotiated.
In analysing labor-market contracts, Gray argues that the "optimal
contract length is inversely related to the variance of the industry-
specific shock" (Gray, 1978, n.1i). Firms are assumed to determine the
degree of indexation and the length of the labor contract by minimizing a
loss function (z) of the form,
(6) z =1/(A.S
E[tin Vt- in o)2J dt +C)
where1 is the contract length and A is a relative price which converts
losses expressed as squared output deviations into losses expressed in the
units of the contracting cost.
Intuitively the optimal contract length in Gray's analysis isdeter-
mined by a condition that at the marpin "balances the per neriod savings
on transactions costs that could be achieved by lengthening the contract
against the concomitant increased losses in the form of larger exnected
output and employment deviations". Thus while "increased uncertainty brings
about a shortening of contract length, Increased contracting costs leads
to a lengthenlnq of contracts"(Gray, 1978, o.7).
In the case of the monopolist who determines both price and output,
itis the cost of information that includes costs of prediction and of
establishing reliability and permanence that leads to Imolicitly long-termcontractual relationships. These considerations have to be weighed
against the profit losses that would be occured if undernricing occurs
for too long. A large discrete adjustment of the exchange rate both
reduces the cost of information as defined above and establishes, as we
have seen, firm expectations about the oersnective increase in costs.
Sincecost-oriented pricing with a mark-up offers the"most typical standard
offairness in buyer-seller relationships (Okun, 1975)a discrete deva-
luationallows sellers to pursue cost-oriented price increases. Thus a
discretedevaluation as opposed to a crawling peg reduces the cost that
the firm bears in explaining to its customers the reason for the price
increase leading to a renegotiation of existing contracts.
Thelength of the new contracts is probably indeterminate as firms
attempt to guess the intentions of the Central Bank. This is especially true
if the discrete adjustment is a break from past exchange rate management
oractices. If firms after some initial period believe that the policy marks
a switch In regimes from a crawling peg torwards a regime of discretly
adjustable exchanne rates and that the established rate is in fact tenable,
then implicit price contracts will be again renegotiated for corresponding
periods of time.
Uncertainty as to the Central Bank's intentions calls on the other
hand for short—period lags. Finally the length of the renegotiated contracts
will probably be the same as before if after the discrete adjustment the
exchange rate continues to crawl. In all cases the contract length will also
be affected by expectations about economic fundamentals and the ability of
policy to correct existing disequllibria.- 19
In summary what can be said unambiguously is that a discrete
exchange rate adjustment will give rise to recontracting and, in the
absence of a clear signal on the part of the government as to its inten-
tions, an increased tendency for shorter-oeriod contracts. This conclu-
sion is similar to that of Aizenmann(1982) who in a different context
argues that sithe optimal frequency of wage re—contracting depends on measures
of aggregate volatility".
3.
The objective of this section s to investigate empirically whether
the resnons1vensofnon-tradd 1ood ririces to exchange rates was faster
in the neriod following the January, 1983 devaluation. For this reason
the analysis is conducted at the aqqregate,sectoral and nroduct level
usino monthly data for two distinct periods namely the whole r%eriod 1979.1 -
1983.12(lono neriod) and the neriod 1979.1 -1982.12(short period).
Table I nresents a summary of exchangerate statistics. The abbre-
viated notation for all variables is oiven in Table 2.It can be readily
seen that both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of
the effective and bilateral exchange rate increased as we move from the
short to the lona period. This Is largely attributed to the January 1983
devaluation (Piaarams I and 2)WhiCh was the largest discrete adjustment







Coef. V. 0.142 0.196
1978.. 6-4982.12 1978.6-1983.12
Mean 48.702 55.754









DDBIE St. Devltjon 0.02 0.030
Coef.V.. 2.083 2.000List ofNotation
EFE —Effectiveexchangerate,12-currencybasket as defined bythe
Bankof Greece.
Source:Bank of Greece.
BIE —Bilateraldrachma/$ exchange rate.
Source Bank of Greec, !1onthl Statistical Bulletin, various issues.
L —Naturallogarithm of a variable.
-Differencednatural logarithm of a variable
DD —Percentagechange of a variable.
PM —Wholesaleonce index of finished products of foreign oriain
(1970 =1.000)
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Statistical
Yearbook of Greece, various issues.
PE —Wholesaleprice index of exported products of local primary and
industrial nroduction (1970 =1.000)
Source: ibid.
NT -Wholesaleonce index of finished products of domestic industrial
production for home consumntion (1970 =1.000).
Source: ibid.
GI —Wholesaleprice index of finished products of local and foreign
origin for home consumption (1970 =1.000).
Source: ibid.
K20 -Wholesaleprice index of domestically produced foodstuffs for
home consumption (1970 =1.000).
Source: ibid.
CPI—Consumerprice index (1970 =1.000)
Source: ibid.
RCPI -Consumerprice index of Greece relative to the weighed CPI of
twelve trading partners, adjusted for exchange rate changes.
(1970 =1.000).
SourcetBankof Greece.
RWPI -Wholesaleprice index of Greece relative to the weighted WPI
of twenty one competitor countries. Both Indices are expres-
sed in dollars. (1980 =1.000)
Source: Bank of Greece.- 22-
Thenominal devaluation of the exchanne rate in January nroduced
a real exchane rate devaluation durino the first iuarter of the year of
the order o 7-12% denendino on the index used to calculate the real ef-
fective exchange rate (Table 3). By the second ciuarter of 1983 however,
the real effective exchanae rate returned rounhlv to its 1980 level as re-
lative nrices deteriorated thus dissinatinri some of the effects of the
nominal adjustment.
Looking more closely at the time series properties of exchange
rates prior and after the discrete adjustment of January 1983, Tables4
and 5 DreSent the autoreoressivestructure of the relevant series for
both oeriods. Each variable is regressed against nast values of itself
goina back roughly to two quarters. As was exnected, the exchange rate
series can be described as an AR1 or random walk process where the first
lag coefficient is close to unity in both periods. This implies that
only the constant ternhis significant in the autoregressive structure
of first differences. The identification of the Greek exchange rate
with an AR1 process is consistent with similar results obtained for
most other Eurooean countries. In almost all cases, the current
neriod's exchance rate nroves to be the best predictor of next period's
rate (Katseli, 1982). As was to be exoected,the coefficient of the
constant term increases in the long as onnosed to the short neriod when
the change in exchange rates is shown to be more sluggish (Table 5).
Contrary to the experience of most European countries, whole-
sale prices also tend to exhibit nroperties of an AR1 process(Tables
6 and 7). In Katseli (1982) this finding also characterized price1. As calculated by the Bank of Greece.
2. Consumer once index (CPI) of Greece relative to the weighted CPI of twelve
trading partners, adjusted for exchange rate changes.
3. Wholesale price index of Greece relative to the weighted WPI of twenty-one compe-





Year EFE1 % EFE RCPI2% ARCPI RWPI3 %RWPI
1980 I. 107.54 103.13
.
II. 99.11 -7.84 98.77 -4.2 100 0 .
III. 96.95 —2.18 96.45 —2.4
iv. 96.40 -0.57 101.03 4.8
1981 i. 92.16 -4.40 101.06 0.0 104.2
88.63 —3.83 99.85 -1.2 102.6 -1.5
86.70 —2.18 97.33 —2.5 102.6 0.0
IV. 87.87 1.35 103.86 6.7 105.8 3.1
1982 I. 85.06 -3.20 103.02 -0.8 105.0 -0.8
II. 81.46 -4.23 103.48 0.5 104.5 -0.5
III. 77.95 -4.31 98.79 —4.5 103.1 -1.3
IV. 77.32 -0.81 102.16 3.4 104.4 1.3
1983 I. 65.50-15.29 90.30 1v-11.6 —H 96.7 -7.4
1[ 66.56 1.61 96.56 6.9 100.6 4.0
III. 65.54 —1.53 94.52 -2.1 99.9 -0.7
1\'. 61.33 -6.42 92.33 -2.3 98.1 -1.R



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































adjustmentin Italy, both hicih-inflation countries in the neriod under
consideration. Only the rice index of exported products (PE) exhibits
higher order autoregressive properties probably as a result of conscious
pricingpolicy. The coefficient of the first-month lag of non-traded qoods
(LNT)istypically smaller than that of traded goods but rises considerably
betweenthe two periods under consideration. The same is true for all
price indices implying that the adjustment of prices is on the average
faster when 1983 is included in the sample period. This is also reflected
in the fact that the coefficient of the constant term in Table 7 increases
in all cases in the long as opposed to the short period. In the case of
the NT index, the average monthly rate of change increases from 1.7 to
1.9 orecent across periods imrlyinq an even larger rate of increase in
1983 alone. In both DLPM and DLPE autoregressions,inclusion of 1983
raises the coefficient of the constant terms and reduces the coefficients
of the significant lagaed terms.
These results seem to sunport thehypothesisthat the adjustment
of prices of both traded and non—traded goods is faster in1983 as op—
Dosedto orevious years. The relationship of this development to ex-
change rate behaviour strengthens the evidence that the discrete de-
valuation of 1983 produced an almostinstantaneousreaction of prices
of both traded and non-traded goods alike.
WhenDLGIis reiressed against lagged values of itself and
against current and laoqed values of the exchange rate (effective and
bilateral),the coefficient of the current exchange rate change term























































































































































































































































































































































































































Thesame holds true in the case of DLNT where the current effective
exchange rate change (DLEFE) seems to influence the current change of
non—traded good prices only in the long period. The results are more
mixed when the bilateral exchange rate i used instead (Table 9.1).
What these results seem to indicate is that adjustment of nontraded
good prices and exchange rates become contemporaneous when 1983 is in-
cluded. This can be seen clearly in Diagrams 3 and 4 where the ex-
chancie rate and once adjustment in January 1983 is connietely
___J yIILflrurI ieu.
Twoadditional points concerning price adjustment of non-traded
goods are also worth noting. The evidence .resented in Diagrams 3 and 4
Is also confirmed by the relatively low explanatory oower of equations
1 and 2 in Table 9. Over the whole neriod, the exchange rate is only
partially responsible for the observed variation in non-traded-good prices
as other factors such as imoorted inflation, wage rate adjustment, mone-
tarydevelooments and the position of the economy over the business cycle
becomemore important. It isonly in January 1983 that the devaluation
ofthe currency becomes the dominant factor that explains most of the
variation in LNT. Lack of consistent monthly data prevent a disaggregated
analysis along these lines. Using quarterly data however it can be shown
that for the whole period 1979.11 -1983.IV,the home-currency price of
imported goods is the most important explanatory variable of DLNT. This
variable reflects changes both in foreign prices and exchange rates and thus
picks up the significant terms—oftrade shocks of the oeriod such as the
second oil-price increase. As one would expect the explanatory power of
the estimated equation is raised considerably (equation 5 in Table 9.11)




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lack of sufficient disaggregation in the provision of data also
unables us to analyse effectively the relationship of pricing behavior
to expectations regarding exchange rate adjustment. According to the evidence n
sented in Table 9, a 10% devaluation of the effective exchange rate is
expected to raise the prices of non-traded goods by 1.4% during the same
month. The unexpected component of the price change between two con-
secutive months is picked up by the residual in the estimated
equation. The vector of estimated residuals from the estimated price
equation can thus be correlated or regressed against the current and
lagged value of residuals obtained from an exchange rate adjustment equa—
tl'an. Such exercise permits an analysis of the resnonsiveness of prices
to exchange rate ThewsWhenmonthly and quarterly data were used however
the results were totally uninformative. The correlation coefficient of
residuals was positive but low (never exceeding .12). Similarly, the
coefficient of the current and lagged unexpected change in the exchange
rate never Droved to be significantly different from zero.
These results nrobably reflect the structure of expectations reaardina
exchange rate developments. Since exchange rates are announced daily,
expectations areformedor revised in a daily basis as well. What would
have been interesting in that case is to proceed with the above analysis
using daily data. Unfortunately only anecdotal evidence of price adjust-
ment following the Janauary 9th devaluation exists precluding an eco-
nometric analysis of the second-order autoregressive system. Further-
more, since most of the price adjustment was completed within a few
days following the devaluation, the adjustment of prices can be ade-
quately explained by the expected component of the exchange rate change
when monthly data are used.- 35 -
Thewholesale price index for non-traded goods is a weighted ave-
rage of sectoral indices. The food-industry sector exciudinci beverages
(K20) nocesses the largest weighting coefficient (18.1%).. In 1980 only
6.6% of the total consumption of processed food was imported, while 90%
of the total production originating in 51 local firms was directed towards
the home market. Furthermore, the ratio of imported intermediate and ca-
pital goods to total production costs was 19.2%, one of the lowest ratios
in all industrial sectors The food industry could then be classified
on all grounds as a non—traded good sector.
Diagrams 5 and 6 present the monthly variation of the price index
(DLK 20) against that of the effective and bilateral exchange rate. It
is relatively easy to see that the change in the exchange rate almost
systematically precedes price adjustment by two-months. This is con-
firmed by the econometric evidence presented in Table 10 where DLK 20
is regressed against past values of itself and current and lagged values
of the exchange rate. In both time periods (1979.5 -1982.12;1979.5 -
1983.12)once adjustment annears relatively sluggish with the own first
and second—month lag generally significant and the second lag on the
drachma-dollar exchange rate significant in both time periods.
There Is no clear evidence however that the responsiveness of
the price to an exchange rate change is significantly altered in the
long period even though the coefficient of the constant term and the
overall explanatory nower of the regression increases when 1983 is
included.
6. Data obtained frorr 51 fIrms out of a samole of 423 firms gathered annual—
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Theambiguity in the results as one moves from the aggregate to
the sectoral data has to do with the composition of the indexand insti-
tutional factors affecting price behavior.
The sectoral index itself is a weighted average of price of products
that minht or micht not be exemnt from rrice controls.
The legal basis for price controls is provided in the HMarket_
Law Code" that essentially classifies products into three categories:
a) essential and in short sunnly
b) essential and not in short supply
c) non-essential.
The first category includes basic consumer goods for which in
most cases,a maximum price is set. For some goods in this category and for all
goods in the second category which are considered essential hut not key con-
sumer goods, the Ministry of Coninerce sets a.maximum allowable mark-up
over average unit costs. The third category includes goods which are
essentially exempt from controls (Lalonde and Papandreou, 1984).
The behaviour of product prices and hence of the aggregate
sectoral index is thus affected by the Ministry's actions in adjust-
ing the price ceiling as a result of firmpressure.This is especial-
ly true in the food sector where a large number of products fall in
the first category.
Diagram 7 exhibits as an examole the rate of change of flour
Drices over a ten-year oeriod. Since flour Is considered an essential


































































































































almostalways set at the price ceiling. As can be seen in the diagram,
the price has been tynically adjusted once a year during the sumer months.
The 1983 price adjustment that occured in August was the largest one in
three years that is 18.7%. Firms producino flour have limited possibili-
ties to diversify their nroduction.7 Hence, the increase in perceived
costs implied by the devaluation gives rise to a fall in profits and a re-
duction in output or quality. As can be seen in Table 12 average production
of grain mill products during the first six months of 1983 decreased by 4.5%
relative to the corresnondina averaae in 1982.
A different type of response is evidenced by firms which diversify
their production across control categories, such as dairy—roduct firms.
Theseusually produce milk, butter, cheese and yoqhurt, all items under
price controls, as well as ice—cream which is not subject to controls. While
firms still exercise pressure to adjust the price ceilinq, losses in
profits and output are mitigated by rapid price adjustment in the non-
controlled items. As can be seen in Table 11, while the prices of all
controlled dairy products increased between 12-14% within the first quar-
ter of 1983, ice—cream nrices were adjusted by almost 10% between December
1982 and January 1983 and by 33% between December 1982 and March 1983.
(Diagram 8). As there is no reason to exDect that relative costs for
ice—creamproduction increased during that period due to any other
factor, it is reasonable to arque that the perceived increase in costs
due to the devaluation was met by twice overshooting in the non-control-
led items. Output of dairy products stayed roughly constant between the
two periods.
Finally within the same sector, there exist firms which produce
commodities in categories (b) and (c) of the Market Code. Such firms for
example produce tomato juice, tomato oulp,canned fruits and fruit juices.
7. Flour mills usually oroduce flour and farina, which is also included






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1982.1 148.8 154.7 176.3 11.2
2 142.3 198.2 247.4 14,6
3 154.0 233.1 207.2 15.6
4 149.2 238.6 50.3 29.9
1A1fl OO 0 I fl A
6 145.6 325.0 5.1 75.7
7 142.6 314.1 17.0 119.8
8 85.5 248.3 0.0 1118.5
9 115.2 202.4 45.9 1043.8
10 103.9 158.7 46.2 403.3
11 113.0 155.3 40.4 54.8
12 106.5 145.2 106.0 32.2
1983.1 114.9 158.2 255.6 22.3
2 143.8 199.9 258.4 21.4
3 159.0 220.3 115.7 21.9
4 152.5 274.3 37.6 29.2
5 130.6 286.5 156.7 54.4
6 140.6 288.6 11.3 81.0
7 132.2 257.8 24.0 452.5
8 138.7 235.3 56.9 1494.3
9 142,1 193.4 109.8 515.3
10 126.6 171.5 0.0 68.6
11 126.7 162.4 9.5 30.3
12 117.8 151.4 30.4 23.5- 45-
Inthat case, price adjustment is distributed more evenly across goods.
As can be seen in Tables 11 and 12 whereas the price of tomato juice and
tomato pulp increased by 8.70% and 2.90% in March and February respective-
ly, prices of canned fruits rose sharply in January and February and fell
in March, that is when the prices of the controlled items were allowed to
Increase. Production of canned fruits and vegetables rose by 30% in the
first semester of 1983 relative to 1982 as firms were able to capture a
larger share of the domestic market relative to imports.
devaluation
The analysis so far suggests that firms responded to the discrete!
in an expected fashion. If prices are not allowed to change due to insti-
tutional or other factors then the expected increase in costs implied by
the devaluation brings about a decrease in profits and a decrease in out-
put. The drop in output could be mitigated by the expected increase in
demanddepending on the cross elasticity of substitution across domestic
and importedfinal goods. In diversified firms, on the other hand, the
loss In profits is cushioned by selective increases in the price of parti-
cular items and output expansion for those anods for which demand increases.
The analysis also confirms the hypothesis that,regardless of control-
classification.prjceadjustnt is generally sluggish so that.a monopolistic
price adjustment model is a suitable one for the pricing behaviour of firms.
'Price contracts" are evidenced in all product cases. Even though their
length depends on institutional factors, a cursory look at nriclnq behavinr
suggests that at least in the non—controlled sector contracts iave in fact
been shortened as aggregate exchange rate variability rose (Diagrams 8 and 9).















































































































































































































thenon-controlled sector and organised pressure by firms to relax price.:
ceilings was successful within a few months especially in the category
(b) classification.
Overall the arbitrary control in prices by central authorities
did not seem to mitigate in the medium-run the inflationary consequences
of the devaluation, in the presence of a large and discrete adjustment
of the exchange rate, thepricelevel was adjusted earlier than expected
mitigatingthe increase in demand for non-traded goods and thus exacerbat-
ing the stagflationary effects of the devaluation.i1i9gr
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